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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
dards for each case, have indicated a willingness to involve both levels
of courts in the development of substantive environmental quality stan-
dards. In assuming an active role in the area, the supreme court would
be wise to consider further development of the trial court's role in cases
under MERA, particularly in resolving the issue of when the White Bear
balancing test should be applied.
Remedies-DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS OF AN UNESTABLISHED Busi-
NESs-Leoni v. Bemis Co., - Minn. -, 255 N.W.2d 824 (1977).
A growing acceptance of present day business methods of predicting
future profitability' has resulted in a substantial liberalization of the
former general rule that damages could not be recovered for the lost
profits of an unestablished business. This denial of recovery is based on
the doctrine of certainty; damages for breach of contract cannot be
speculative, remote, or conjectural.3 Originally, even the lost profits of
an established business were considered inherently too uncertain to be
awarded in either a tort or contract action.' Courts began to modify this
absolute exclusion by stating that lost profits could be recovered if
three prerequisites were satisfied: the loss was caused by the breach,5
1. See generally C. ALMON, AmERIcAN ECONOMY TO 1975 (1966); Denning, New Look at
Business Forecasts, 64 NATION'S Bus. 48 (1976); Wheelwright & Clarke, Corporate fore-
casting: promise and reality, 54 HAav. Bus. Rxv. 40 (1976).
The RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 331, Comment b (1932) defines profits as "the net
pecuniary gain from a transaction, the gross pecuniary gains diminished by the cost of
obtaining them." See King Features Syndicate v. Courrier, 241 Iowa 870, 882, 43 N.W.2d
718, 726 (1950). See also Swaney v. Derragon, 281 Mich. 142, 143-44, 274 N.W. 741, 741
(1937).
2. Formerly, damages could not be recovered for any loss of profits, even though the
business was established. W. HALE & R. CooLagY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 32
(2d ed. 1912). Exceptions to the complete denial rule began to appear in the mid-
nineteenth century. See, e.g., Masterton v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 7 Hill 61, 72 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1845) (profits directly attributable to contract, but not profits from further transac-
tions with third parties, held recoverable); cf. Village of Elbow Lake v. Otter Tail Power
Co., 281 Minn. 43, 46, 160 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1968)(recognizing unestablished business
rule). See also D. Dons, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.3 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill Noyes v. Lazere, 301 Minn. 462, 467, 222
N.W.2d 799, 803 (1974); Olson v. Naymark, 177 Minn. 383, 384, 225 N.W. 275, 275 (1929);
Note, Damages-Loss of Profits Caused by Breach of Contract-Proof of Certainty, 17
MNN. L. REv. 194 (1933).
4. See R. BAuER, EssENTIALS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 75, at 160 n.1 (1919). See also
Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, 551 (1863) (allowance of profits as damages less limited
in tort action than in breach of contract action).
5. The requirement of causation is outside the scope of this comment. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has recognized, however, the causation requirement. See Faust v. Parrott,
270 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. 1978) (in breach of noncompete clause action, plaintiff's lost
profits must be caused by breach; possibility of poor management, market changes, and
change of business name to be considered as possible alternative causes); Northern Petro-
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the loss was foreseeable," and the amount of the loss could be proved
with sufficient certainty.' This modification of a formerly per se exclu-
sion has helped those claimants with an established business and a
history of past profits.' Even today, however, an established business
frequently has difficulty recovering profits lost as the result of a breach
of contract. With no past profits to serve as a basis for calculating the
award with reasonable certainty, 9 an unestablished business is faced
with often insurmountable proof problems. In Leoni v. Bemis Co.,"'
the requisite quantum of proof was met: the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff had proved a loss of prospective profits" with
sufficient certainty to be entitled to recovery.'
2
The plaintiff in Leoni had produced and sold peat moss in approxi-
mately three-fourths of the United States for thirteen years. For his
initial venture into the California market in 1971, the plaintiff pur-
chased plastic bags from the defendant. Because the plastic bags lacked
an ultraviolet ray inhibitor, the bags containing the peat moss disinte-
grated when stored outdoors in the California sun. The defect in the
bags made the peat moss unsalable, preventing the plaintiff from profit-
ing in California as he had nationally. In the resulting breach of contract
action, the jury awarded damages for the loss of profits incurred on the
initial California contracts because of the defective bags. This award
was not disputed by the defendant.'3 When the jury also awarded dam-
chem. Co. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 297 Minn. 118, 124, 211 N.W.2d 159, 166 (1973)
(recovery of lost profits for period in which occupancy of new building delayed because of
defective design; loss direct and proximate result of injury); Note, Lost Profits as Contract
Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 997 (1956).
6. "The damages must be such as may fairly be supposed to have entered into the
contemplation of the parties when they made the contract, that is, must be such as might
naturally be expected to follow its violation." Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 494-95 (1858).
This is an application of the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
See Paine v. Sherwood, 19 Minn. 315 (1873); McCormick, The Contemplation Rule as a
Limitation Upon Damages for Breach of Contract, 19 MINN. L. REv. 497, 499-504 (1935).
7. Absolute certainty is not required. See Vogue v. Shopping Centers, Inc., 58 Mich.
App. 421, 228 N.W.2d 403 (1975) (business failed to meet burden of proof that lost profits
must be shown with reasonable certainty); Northern Petrochem. Co. v. Thorsen & Thor-
shov, Inc., 297 Minn. 118, 125, 211 N.W.2d 159, 166 (1973); McCormick, The Recovery of
Damages for Loss of Expected Profits, 7 N.C. L. REv. 235, 238-39 (1929). See generally
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 311 (1932).
8. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Grengs, 237 Minn. 196, 54 N.W.2d 105 (1952); Force Bros.
v. Gottwald, 149 Minn. 268, 183 N.W. 356 (1921); Pappas v. Stark, 123 Minn. 81, 142 N.W.
1046 (1913); Johnson v. Wild Rice Boom Co., 118 Minn. 24, 136 N.W. 262 (1912); cf. Ellis
v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 396-97, 225 N.W. 395, 397 (1929) (recovery justified because
plaintiff's business "had been established for several years").
9. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
10. - Minn. __, 255 N.W.2d 824 (1977).
11. The court alternately referred to the profits as prospective profits, future profits,
and profits. See id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 826.
12. See id. at __ , 255 N.W.2d at 826-27.
13. The defendant did not dispute the propriety of the following awards: $7,499.30 for
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ages for loss of anticipated profits, the trial court granted the defend-
ant's motion for a new trial, 4 ruling that it had erred in permitting the
award of lost profits because the plaintiff's California business was un-
established. Holding that the plaintiff had proved his loss of future
profits with the requisite certainty, the Minnesota Supreme Court re-
versed the order for a new trial and remanded the case with instructions
to reinstate the jury's verdict.'
In denying the existence of a per se unestablished business rule"' in
Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized a more flexible
form of the rule. 7 Although the per se unestablished business rule auto-
matically denies recovery of profits by a new or unestablished business, "
Minnesota's more flexible version of the rule is concerned with the evi-
dentiary basis for the award." The court stated that an unestablished
business possibly could recover future profits, although, admittedly, an
unestablished business does not have the benefit of a history of profits.2"
The denial of future profits to new businesses will frequently occur
because "lacking a history of profits, new businesses rarely have evi-
dence upon which an award of damages may be based with the requisite
loss of profits on the initial California contracts the plaintiff breached, $4500 for market
promotion, $2400 for defective bags, $3000 to salvage the market, $4500 for the failure to
return plaintiffs name plates in good condition. Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 825-26 n.2.
14. Id. at , 255 N.W.2d at 825. The court conditioned the new trial on the plaintiff's
nonacceptance of a remittitur of the jury award for loss of future profits. Id.
15. Id.
16. Although the rule is often called a "new business rule" by the courts and commenta-
tors, the term "unestablished business rule" is more inclusive and thus more accurate.
17. The court stated, "although the law recognizes that it is more difficult to prove loss
of prospective profits to a new business than to an established one, the law does not hold
that it may not be done." - Minn. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 826.
18. The unestablished business rule simply states that an unestablished business can-
not recover lost profits for breach of contract because the loss cannot be proved with the
requisite certainty. See Comment, Remedies-Lost Profits for Contract Damages for an
SlInestablished Business: The New Business Rule Becomes Outdated, 56 N.C. L. Rav. 693,
693 (1978).
The Eighth Circuit explained:
[Ainticipated profits of a business are generally so dependent upon numer-
ous and uncertain contingencies that their amount is not susceptible of proof
with any reasonable degree of certainty; hence the general rule that the ex-
pected profits of a commercial business are too remote, speculative and uncer-
tain to warrant a judgment . . ..He who is prevented from embarking in a
new business can recover no profits, because there are no provable data of past
business from which the fact that anticipated profits would have been realized
can be legally deduced.
Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96, 98-99 (8th Cir. 1901).
19. See - Minn. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 826. This version recognizes that past profits
are highly persuasive evidence but does not consider their absence fatal. See; e.g., Smith
Dev. Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 213, 308 A.2d 477, 482 (1973); Dunn,
Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits in California, 9 U.S.F. L. Rv. 415, 434 (1975).
20. See - Minn. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 826.
I Vol. 5282
3
et al.: Remedies—Damages for Lost Profits of an Unestablished Business—Le
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979
CASE NOTES
degree of reasonable certainty."2' The court emphasized that mathe-
matical precision in proof of loss is not required;" proof to a reasonable
certainty is sufficient." While the established business generally can
offer proof of past events to substantiate the fact of the loss and to serve
as a reasonable basis for the computation of the award, a new business
does not have records of past experiences from which future profits could
be projected. In Leoni, reasonable certainty was achieved because the
plaintiff had already established a profitable business enterprise in
three-fourths of the states and was able to prove his national profit
margin. The plaintiff also proved that his profits outside California had
doubled or tripled during the three years between the defendant's
breach and the trial. If the plaintiff's initial marketing in California had
not been the extension of an existing operation, it is doubtful that the
court would have strayed from "the general rule that proof of loss of
profits in a new business is too speculative to be the basis for recovery."2 4
In reaching its decision in Leoni, the court ignored its earlier recogni-
tion of a per se unestablished business rule in Village of Elbow Lake v.
Otter Tail Power Co.,2 a case involving a proposed power plant. The
court did not expressly adopt the per se version of the rule in Elbow
Lake, but it did base its denial of recovery for lost profits on the impossi-
bility of an accurate determination of lost profits for "a new plant, newly
21. Id.
22. See id.; cf. Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196,
229 N.W.2d 521 (1975) (allowing approximation of damages where defective meter mea-
sured electricity flowing over only one of three lines). But cf. Faust v. Parrott, 270 N.W.2d
117, 120 (Minn. 1978) ("While the law most certainly does not require that damages be
calculable with absolute precision, damages must nevertheless be ascertainable with rea-
sonable exactness and may not be the product of benevolent speculation.").
23. See - Minn. at _ 255 N.W.2d at 826; cf. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931) ("The rule which precludes the recovery
of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to those
damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of
their amount.").
One noted commentator has stated that the plaintiff must show with certainty that the
profits were lost and must also show the amount of the profits. This latter requirement is
less strict, however, not requiring mathematical precision. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES § 27 (1935); McCormick, supro note 7, at 238. A number of
decisions follow this method of calculating damages. See Northrup v. Miles Homes, Inc.,
204 N.W.2d 850, 857 (Iowa 1973) (quoting with approval Patterson v. Patterson, 189
N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa 1971)); Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304
Minn. 196, 202, 229 N.W.2d 521, 525-26 (1975); Willmar Gas Co. v. Duininck, 236 Minn.
499, 506, 53 N.W.2d 225, 229 (1952). But cf. Faust v. Parrott, 270 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Minn.
1978) (in action for breach of noncompete clause, defendant's actual profit resulting from
breach must be shown; demonstration that plaintiff would have obtained these profits
required; financial records of business plaintiff purchased showing profits before and after
sale must be introduced).
24. Village of Elbow Lake v. Otter Tail Power Co., 281 Minn. 43, 46, 160 N.W.2d 571,
574 (1968).
25. 281 Minn. 43, 160 N.W.2d 571 (1968).
4
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constructed, with no experience."26 The village had offered expert testi-
mony on predicted costs of operating from which profits could be pro-
jected; however, the court found that the efficiency of management and
the costs of operation were too variable to be assessed accurately.2 7
Therefore, even though the new power plant would be taking over an
established operation, the court reasoned that the newly constructed
plant had no experience on which to base projected profits.
2
8
No similar concern with variable expenses was expressed by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court in Smith Development Corp. v. Bilow
Enterprises, Inc., 29 the case cited by the Leoni court in support of its
holding.3 0 In Smith, McDonald's sought the profits it lost during the
period of time it was unable to operate its restaurant." The trial court
had excluded the testimony of a college professor who was to estimate
the loss sustained by McDonald's through sales projections and evalua-
tions.2 Testimony by McDonald's marketing research manager, de-
scribing the uniformity of the procedures, the quality, and the success
of McDonald's restaurants, also was stricken from the record. The court
held that the testimony of the professor and the marketing research
manager, in conjunction with earnings and expense figures for McDon-
ald's for a twenty-five mile radius of the site, could have satisfied the
requirement of an adequate evidentiary basis for the jury's determina-
tion of the profit lost and that the court, therefore, committed error in
excluding the testimony. 3 No concern was expressed by the court in
Smith, as had been expressed by the Minnesota court in Elbow Lake,
that the efficiency of management was a variable that made predictions
of profits hopelessly inaccurate. Perhaps the availability of figures for
other McDonald's in the area made the difference.
Minnesota appears to be following the trend away from the. strict
requirement that a business be established before future profits can be
awarded. 4 This is not a drastic departure from prior Minnesota deci-
sions, but simply another small erosion of the general rule that the proof
of lost profits for an unestablished business is inherently too speculative
to justify an award of damages. How much erosion of the per se rule
actually has been accomplished by Leoni, however, is still uncertain.
26. Id. at 46, 160 N.W.2d at 574.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. 112 R.I. 203, 308 A.2d 477 (1973) (cited in Leoni v. Bemis Co., - Minn. at.,
255 N.W.2d at 826-27).
30. - Minn. at __, 255 N.W.2d at 826-27.
31. 112 R.I. at 212, 308 A.2d at 482.
32. See id. at 214, 308 A.2d at 483.
33. See id. at 213-14, 308 A.2d at 483 (remanded for new trial).
34. See, e.g., Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 419 U.S. 987 (1974); Mechanical Wholesale, Inc. v. Universal-Rundle Corp.,
432 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1970); Vickers v. Wichita State Univ., 213 Kan. 614, 518 P.2d 512
(1974); Comment, supra note 18.
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Although the business records of a successful national business can pro-
vide a basis for the computation of lost profits for one of its territories,
this same principle might not extend to the several retail outlets of a
local merchandiser,5 or to the owner of a franchise operation with less
success than McDonald's .
3
The Leoni decision does not necessarily foreshadow the abandonment
of the unestablished business rule in favor of relying on the kind of
economic data a business person might use in making investment deci-
sions.3" Even the former requirement that a business have a past history
of profit to serve as a basis for the award was not relaxed totally in
Leoni; the court was able to use the plaintiff's national profit margin as
a basis for recovery-a basis from which the court could comfortably
extrapolate conclusions as to the amount of profit lost as a result of the
defendant's breach. But perhaps even this small erosion of the un-
established business rule will increase a plaintiff's chance of establish-
ing the requisite certainty through a combination of indirect evidence
such as sales projections,18 general industry conditions,3" or the experi-
ences of the plaintiffs predecessor,"' successor," or competitors.2 Cer-
tainly the possibility of an increasing acceptance of the use of economic
evidence that a business person would find relevant has not been fore-
closed.
The court has achieved flexibility by modeling the unestablished
business rule to permit the recovery of profits proved with reasonable
certainty and by retaining a flexible standard of certainty. As the Min-
nesota court has stated, "[allong the line from speculation to certainty
there is a point not found by mathematical demonstration where it can
35. But cf. Lucky Auto Supply v. Turner, 244 Cal. App. 2d 872, 883, 53 Cal. Rptr. 628,
634 (1966) (evidence of profits at other stores in local chain admissible as basis for dam-
ages).
36. See Gordon v. Indusco Mgmt. Corp., 164 Conn. 262, 320 A.2d 811 (1973) (reversal
of award of damages to owners of a Heap Big Beef franchise).
37. See note 1 supra.
38. See generally Comment, supra note 18, at 719-29.
39. See Note, The Requirement of Certainty in the Proof of Lost Profits, 64 HARV. L.
REv. 317, 320 (1950).
40. Cf. Goebel v. Hough, 26 Minn. 252, 256, 2 N.W. 847, 849 (1879) (lost profits for
interruption of established business shown by proving monthly sales of business prior to
interruption). But cf. Village of Elbow Lake v. Otter Tail Power Co., 281 Minn. 43, 46,
160 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1968) (same owner but new facilities for operation).
41. See, e.g., Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970) (distributor
of Peugeots introduced evidence of Volvo sales in same area at same time; however, the
court also permitted a comparison of the performance of plaintiffrs successor). But see
Smith v. Eubanks & Hill, 72 Ga. 280, 288-89 (1884) (profits made by successor to a lease
of a grocery store and bar not considered).
42. See, e.g., William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Leow's, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.
Pa. 1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948);
ef. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946) (comparison with competitor
permitted but not relied on).
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be said that a jury or other fact-finding tribunal can give a safe judg-
ment of the amount of damages flowing from a breach."'" This retention
of flexibility is to be applauded; "more definite and mechanical rules
would lead to greater certainty, but it would be the 'certainty of injus-
tice."'"
43. Olson v. Naymark, 177 Minn. 383, 384, 225 N.W. 275, 275 (1929).
44. McCormick, supra note 7, at 248.
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